In a high-risk industry like construction, following correct safety procedures is extremely important. An unsafe work site may not only lead to a construction worker injuring themselves, but could also cause injuries to others. When construction workers cut corners on safety it can have dangerous consequences.

Take for instance the Indiana construction case of John Mazzorana v. Emil Perrotta Co., Inc., 06 L 12451. The 33 year-old plaintiff, John Mazzorana, fell 30 feet after stepping onto an unsupported walking plank. As a result of the fall, Mazzorana ruptured his Achilles tendon and a tendon in his foot and sustained fractures to his left heel and spine.

At the time of the 2006 construction injury, Mazzorana had been working as a bricklayer on the Coffee Creek Center construction project in Chesterton, Indiana. Mazzorana and his fellow bricklayers began work on the project at 7:00 a.m. That same morning, carpenters from Emil Perrotta Co. were also working on the construction project and borrowed some of the bricklayers’ scaffolding to assist their work. However, after the carpenters were done, they left an unsupported walking plank in place.

It was this unsupported walking plank that Mazzorana stepped out onto as he returned to work. The unsupported plank gave way, causing Mazzorana to fall 30 feet to the ground. The severity of his injuries required Mazzorana to undergo surgery; however, he still has hardware in his foot. It has been over five years since his construction site injury, yet Mazzorana is still unable to return to work as a bricklayer.

Continue reading

It is fairly common for companies to include a non-compete clause in their employee documents, which generally prohibits individuals from competing against the company during the course of their employment. However, this does not prevent some employees from violating these covenants not to compete. The recent Illinois Supreme Court case of Reliable Fire Equipment Co. v. Arredondo, 2011 IL 111871, clarifies the legal analysis regarding violations of non-compete clauses.

Reliable Fire Equipment is an Illinois company that sells, installs, and services fire prevention and alarm systems. The defendant, Rene Garcia, began working for Reliable in 1992, at which time he signed a covenant not to compete as part of his employee agreement. The co-defendant, Arnold Arredondo, signed a similar agreement when he began working for Reliable in 1998. Under this agreement, both employees agreed not to compete with Reliable both for the duration of their employment and one year following their termination. The covenant further specified that employees were specifically prohibited from competing in Illinois and the surrounding bordering states of Indiana and Wisconsin.

The business litigation issue in Reliable arose under claims that both defendants violated this agreement during the course of their employment. While still working for Reliable, Arrendondo founded High Rise Security Systems, LLC, a company dedicated to selling fire alarm systems in the Chicagoland area. Soon thereafter, Garcia signed an operating agreement with High Rise; he was also still employed by Reliable.

Continue reading

An Illinois jury evaluated a bicycle accident lawsuit to determine not only whether the defendant driver was liable, but also whether her employer was liable in Cedric Bacon v. City of Joliet, Sgt. Cordelia Dunn , 08L-859. The personal injury lawsuit arose out of a bicycle accident in which the defendant, Sgt. Cordelia Dunn, struck the plaintiff’s bicycle while driving 50 mph through an intersection. Sgt. Dunn was responding to a call under her duty as a Joliet Police Officer, thereby making her employer, the Joliet Police Department, liable as well.

Cedric Bacon, the injured bicyclist who brought the personal injury claim against Sgt. Dunn for the injuries he sustained from the Joliet bicycle accident. Bacon required an open reduction internal fixation (ORIF) surgery to repair the broken bones in his right leg; the breaks were so severe that the surgeons needed to place screws and plates to try to stabilize the bones. Despite the surgery, injuries to the surrounding artery and nerves caused Bacon to develop a severe foot drop. In addition, Bacon suffered a severe brain injury and developed subsequent anxiety.

At the personal injury trial, the bulk of the testimony centered on what happened at the intersection accident and whether Sgt. Dunn was acting within the scope of her employment. In an unusual turn of events, Sgt. Dunn refused to testify for her discovery deposition. As a result, the judge barred her from testifying at trial, forcing the defense to find an alternative way to represent Dunn’s versions of the events. To do so, the City of Joliet hired two accident reconstruction experts to reconstruct the intersection accident and testify before the jury at trial.

Continue reading

A judge’s job is to enforce the letter of the law. However, every so often a judge is presented with a case that whose law is not laid out in prior statute or case law. Take for instance the personal injury case of Gayane Zokhrabov v. Jeung-Hee Park, etc., 2011 IL App. (1st) 102672. The unique case facts meant that there was no clear legal precedent, leaving it up to the Illinois Appellate Court to establish a new precedent.

Zokhrabov arose out of an Illinois train accident in which Hiroyuko Joho was killed after being struck by a train. The plaintiff in the personal injury lawsuit, Gayane Zokhrabov, was standing on the train platform when Joho was hit by the fast-moving train. Zokhrabov was injured after being struck down by one of Joho’s body parts; she then sued Joho’s estate for her fractured wrist, legs, and shoulder.

The theory of liability in the Illinois personal injury lawsuit was that Joho’s negligence caused Zokhrabov’s injuries and that his estate should be liable for those injuries. Because the fact pattern in Zokhrabov’s was unique and unprecedented, the Cook County judge handling the case relied on a similar Illinois lawsuit to make his ruling – Cunis v. Brennan, 56 Ill.2d 372, 308 N.E.2d 617 (1974).

Continue reading

When deciding a trial case, a jury has a duty to be consistent in its verdict, i.e., it can’t say one thing, but then enter a contrary verdict. If a jury contradicts itself, generally one party has cause to overturn or vacate that verdict. This is what happened in the Illinois personal injury lawsuit of Gerald English v. Anthony Daniel McLaughlin, 10 L 677 (DuPage County). A judge ruled to vacate the verdict in favor of the defendant after the jury entered inconsistent statements.

The facts of English v. McLaughlin involved a 2007 Glendale Heights bicycle accident. The plaintiff, Gerald English, was biking southbound on Glen Ellyn Road and crossing Armitage Avenue. At the Illinois personal injury trial, English testified that he entered the intersection on a green light and that the light turned yellow as he was biking through. English estimated that he was biking around 17 mph at the time and was therefore unable to stop when the defendant, Anthony McLaughlin, turned left in front of him.

English’s bike ended up striking the rear-end of McLaughlin’s car and resulted in multiple bone fractures. English fractured his right knee, left shoulder, and right finger. And while none of his fractures required surgery, his injuries did prevent English from performing his normal engineering duties for about two months following the Illinois bicycle accident.

Continue reading

The Illinois Appellate Court reviewed the personal injury lawsuit of Anderson v. Anderson, 2011 Ill.App. (1st) 10034 (Sept. 30, 2011), to determine whether or not the trial judge had correctly ordered a new trial. After reviewing the case facts and the jury’s decision, the appellate court disagreed with the trial judge and reversed his order for a new trial. As a result, the not guilty verdict entered against the two defendants in Anderson stands.

Anderson arose out of a two-vehicle collision between a mini-van driven by defendant Sean Anderson and a vehicle driven by defendant Frank Fratto. The personal injury claim was filed by the six passengers in Anderson’s van at the time of the car accident and was brought against both of the drivers involved in the intersection accident. The personal injury claim alleged that both Anderson and Fratto were at fault for the auto crash and therefore were both responsible for the plaintiffs’ injuries.

However, the Illinois jury found in favor of both defendants and failed to find either at fault for the intersection accident. Rather than letting this verdict stand, the trial judge ruled that the verdict was invalid and granted a new trial. When defending his ruling, the judge stated that “the jury’s finding that neither was negligent given the facts of this case is unreasonable and against the manifest weight of the evidence. The jury had the discretion of apportioning the fault between the two parties, but a wash of liability is not an option when the injured is not an active participant in the cause of the incident.”

Continue reading

When a civil lawsuit is subject to an appeal, there are typically two outcomes: either the court finds that the trial proceedings were just and legal, thereby putting an end to the case; or the court finds that errors were made at the trial court level and remands the case for a retrial. In the personal injury lawsuit of Michael Petraski, etc. v. Deborah Thedos, etc, et al., 2011 IL App. (1st) 103218

, the Illinois Appellate Court reviewed the case’s trial proceedings a second time. In its most recent review, the court ordered yet another trial for the 2001 intersection accident lawsuit.

Petraski arose out of a 2001 Memorial Day crash involving the plaintiff, Margaret Petraski, and the defendant, Sheriff Officer Deborah Thedos. At the time of the intersection accident, Thedos was responding to a domestic dispute. In order to do so in a speedy fashion, Thedos ran a red light and crashed into Petraski’s vehicle. The impact killed a passenger in Petraski’s car and left Petraski an incomplete quadriplegic.

Following the first Illinois trial, the jury entered a $26.8 million verdict against Thedos and the Cook County Sheriff’s Department. However, the defendants appealed this decision, arguing that the trial judge improperly excluded evidence of Petraski’s alcohol consumption during the hours leading up to the car crash. Therefore, a second trial was initiated which allowed this persuasive evidence. At the conclusion of the second trial, the jury now returned a not guilty verdict in favor of the defendants.

Continue reading

In a large metropolitan area like Chicago it is not unheard of for a jury to return a $10 million or more personal injury verdict. Because large cities have large populations, the chances are greater that severe injuries will occur among that large population. However, in smaller districts, such as that of Warren County in downstate Illinois, the likelihood of a severe injury occurring are less. Therefore, a personal injury lawsuit like that of Warren County verdict, that results in a $2.5 million settlement can become the highest settlement ever reported in that county.

The facts surrounding the case arose out of a hit and run accident involving the plaintiff bicyclist and the defendant driver. The plaintiff was riding his bicycle on 180th Avenue near 90th Street in Monmouth, Illinois, a city located about 175 miles from Chicago. It was broad daylight and by all reports the conditions were clear. At the same time, the defendant was driving his parents’ Ford F-150 pickup truck.

The defendant hit the plaintiff from behind, causing fairly severe injuries. However, instead of helping the cyclist, the defendant driver left the scene of the accident. It was later revealed that at the time of the Illinois bicycle accident the defendant was driving on a suspended license. In addition, over the ten years prior he had received over 40 moving violations.

Continue reading

Honda recently announced it will be recalling over 300,000 vehicles worldwide due to air bag problems. The Honda recall has been issued for some of its most popular models, including the Accord, Civic, Odyssey, Pilot, and CR-V.

The recall affects driver-side airbags. According to a statement by Honda, the faulty airbags have been shown to inflate with too much pressure during a crash, which in turn has caused injuries to drivers. To date, the car manufacturer has cited at least 20 accidents related to the over-inflated airbags, with at least two resulting in the driver’s death.

The current recall represents an expansion of earlier airbag recalls in 2008, 2009, and 2010. However, while the original recall was thought to be related to a problem with excessive moisture developing in the airbag’s inflator propellant, the current recall is thought to be caused by a defective stamping machine. Whether this recall is the result of a design error or a product defect remains to be seen.

Continue reading

A Circuit Court judge ruled on a provision in an insurance policy claim that arose out of a 2003 Chicago porch collapse. At issue was whether or not the death and injuries of several individuals was the result of a single occurrence. The judge decided in favor of the defendant insurance company, which contended that the injuries arising out of the porch collapse constituted a single occurrence in Jean Ware, et al. v. First Specialty Insurance Corp., 10 CH 10841.

The 2003 porch collapse that is the subject of Ware occurred in Chicago’s Lincoln Park neighborhood. The various plaintiffs were outside on a third story porch when it collapsed; thirteen individuals died while many others suffered severe injuries. The building was insured by First Specialty Insurance Corp.; therefore, the injured plaintiffs brought a claim against the insurance company for the personal injuries and wrongful deaths that arose out of the porch collapse.

The current issue deals with the fact that the First Specialty Insurance policy had a limit of $1 million per occurrence and a $2 million aggregate limit for multiple occurrences. While the plaintiffs argued that their injuries constituted multiple occurrences since the related deaths happened at different times, the defendant argued that the claim constituted one occurrence because all the injuries arose out of the porch collapse. If the judge ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, then there would be a $2 million policy cap; whereas if the judge ruled in favor of the defendant, then there would only be a $1 million policy cap.

Continue reading