Justia Lawyer Rating for Robert D. Kreisman

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Old Navy is being sued under claims of inadequate security at its Chicago State Street store in Lowe, et al. v. Old Navy, LLC, No. 10 L 7624. The issue of the Chicago premise liability lawsuit involves a murder-suicide that occurred in an employee-restricted area of the Chicago location.

On May 7, 2010, Tranesha Palms was shot and killed by Eugene Robertson, the father of her two year-old son. Reports indicate that the shooting may have been in response to a dispute between the two parents and the fact that Palms had moved out of their home shortly before the Chicago shooting. The Illinois inadequate security lawsuit was brought on behalf of their surviving son.

The estate alleges that Palms’s death could have been prevented if better security had been provided by the Chicago Old Navy store. The morning of her death Palms entered the store by way of a restricted employee entrance. However, she required another employee to buzz her in, at which point Robertson entered with her. Once inside the restricted area of the store Robertson shot and killed Palms before then killing himself.

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A $6.25 million settlement was reached in an Illinois work site injury lawsuit filed in the Circuit Court of Cook County for a roofing accident that occurred at a Chicago South Side Metra facility, Luis Vasquez, et al., v. Walsh Construction Company, et al., No. 04 L 011387. The construction site injury lawsuit was brought by a Chicago roofer who fell 20 feet to a concrete floor while replacing concrete panel roofing tiles. The Cook County case was filed against Metra and several other contractors whom the plaintiff contended were liable for his injuries.

As a result of his fall, the roofer suffered a mild traumatic brain injury, fractured his wrist, herniated several discs in his spine, tore his knee cartilage, and sprained his ankle. The Chicago construction site accident occurred in 2004 and the plaintiff has not been able to return to work. Prior to the accident he had been a union roofer for over 30 years.

Like many construction site accident lawsuits, in Vasquez the plaintiffs alleged that multiple defendants played a role in the resulting injury. Metra was involved in the lawsuit because it owned the Chicago facility where the construction site accident occurred. Metra had contracted its tile replacement project to Walsh Construction Co., who was then responsible for overseeing the roof maintenance. Walsh in turn sub-contracted the labor to Knickerbocker Roofing and Paving Co., who was the plaintiff’s employer and would later be added to the case as a third-party defendant. Consoer Townsend Environdyne (CTE Inc.) was the site engineer of the roofing project while Cotter Consulting was responsible for determining which roofing panels needed to be replaced.

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While it is somewhat common for two vehicles involved in an Illinois car accident to be covered by the same insurance company, it is very rare that both those vehicles are covered under the same insurance policy. In Progressive Premier Insurance Company of Illinois v. Kocher, No. 5-07-0468, both vehicles involved in an Illinois motorcycle accident were owned by the same family and covered on the same insurance policy. The case was brought to the Illinois Appellate Court to help shed light on what to do in these unusual circumstances.

The Illinois auto accident occurred when Nick Kocher’s motorcycle collided with his father’s ATV. Luke Kocher was a passenger on the ATV at the time of the crash and sustained severe head injuries. Luke required a lengthy hospitalization and recovery, which resulted in a large amount of medical bills.

The Kocher family turned to Progressive Insurance Company of Illinois, their auto insurer, for payment of the bills that were a result of the motorcycle accident. Both the motorcycle and ATV were insured on the same policy, along with a third vehicle. The policy coverage included limits of $100,000 per person and $300,000 total for each vehicle.

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A recent Illinois Appellate court decision on a product liability claim reviewed the elements needed to prove strict liability in an Illinois product liability claim. In Charles Salerno v. Innovative Surveillance Technology, Inc., No. 1-09-1402, the plaintiff appealed the trial court’s decision to grant the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s decision, but for different reasons.

The basis of the product liability claims in Salerno are centered around an injury the plaintiff sustained while working in a surveillance cargo van manufactured by the defendant. The van contained a video periscope system. The plaintiff’s injury occurred when he tried to stand inside the cargo van and struck his head on the metal periscope. According to the plaintiff’s product liability complaint, his severe head trauma and resulting seizures could have been avoided if the defendant’s product had not been unreasonably dangerous and defective.

The trial court granted the defendant manufacturer’s motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the risk of being harmed by the periscope was open and obvious and that the defendant had no duty to protect the plaintiff from any resulting injuries.

Upon review, the Appellate Court was critical of the trial court’s reason for dismissing the Illinois product defect lawsuit. In a prior decision the Illinois Supreme Court decided that a product’s open and obvious risk of harm does not constitute an absolute defense in a strict liability count. While this defense may be considered as part of the risk-utility analysis it can not constitute the only factor.

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A Chicago train accident case was recently settled on behalf of one of the passengers injured in the 2005 train derailment. The Metra train was operated by Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter Railroad Corporation, who has agreed to pay the plaintiff $2 million for the injuries he sustained as a result of the Illinois train accident. Hurley v. Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter Railroad Corporation, No. 05 L 10416.

The injured Illinois resident suffered shoulder, hip, and leg injuries as a result of the Illinois train derailment. The plaintiff required multiple surgeries for his fractured him and underwent a lengthy physical therapy program. There were several additional passengers who were injured on that date and two women died; however, the $2 million settlement is for Kevin Hurley’s injuries only. The families of the two women who died as a result of the derailment have previously settled their Illinois wrongful death claims for $11 million. Presumably the other parties have also filed their own claims against Metra.

According to the National Transportation Safety Board‘s railroad accident brief, the September 17, 2005 Metra derailment was the result of the engineer’s failure to obey signals warning him to reduce his speed and failure to obey the speed restrictions at the train crossover. At the time of the accident the Rock Island Metra train was going 69 mph through a track crossover area; the maximum allowable speed is 10 mph. As a result of the high speeds and the severe angle of the track caused the wheels to jump the track and derail.

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A Cook County legal malpractice lawsuit involving the 2002 purchase of a private jet by former Chicago Bulls player Scottie Pippen recently came to a close. The former NBA star sued his Chicago law firm, Pedersen & Houpt, alleging that it had not properly disclosed the details of the ’02 transaction that left him the sole owner of a private jet. Pippen received $2 million as a result of the Cook County jury trial; Pippen & Air Pip, Inc. v. Pedersen & Houpt, et al., No. 04 L 34444.

Pippen’s complaint alleged that at the time he was purchasing the private jet he was under the impression that he was investing $1 million for a quarter-share of the plane and would only need to pay for expenses related to its use and upkeep. However, in reality the basketball player was purchasing 51 percent of the plane, taking out a loan of $5 million to do so.

When signing the documents Pippen stated that he believed that his lawyers at Pedersen & Houpt had approved the deal and was unaware that the conditions of the purchase had changed and that he was taking out a loan. According to the allegations Pippen lost $8 million as a result of the purchase.

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An Illinois nursing home abuse lawsuit was recently the subject of a review by the Illinois Appellate Court; Peterson v. Residential Alternatives of Illinois, Inc., No. 3-09-0743. The court reviewed whether the Illinois nursing home had the right to demand the decedent’s estate arbitrate its two-count complaint claiming a wrongful death count and a survival action count under the Illinois Nursing Home Care Act.

The trial court upheld the defendant’s right to arbitrate and denied plaintiff’s request for a jury trial. This arbitration clause issue was recently ruled on by the Illinois Supreme Court in Carter v. SSC Odin Operating Co., LLC, No. 106511 (4/15/10), where the Court upheld the nursing home’s right to arbitrate in Illinois nursing home abuse cases.

The main issue in both Peterson and Carter revolves around the signed arbitration agreement. However, while in Carter the arbitration language was included in the nursing home care contract, in Peterson the arbitration agreement was a separate document. It seems that this seemingly small difference has in fact resulted in a very different legal outcome in Peterson.

The Appellate Court held that even though the two documents were signed on the same date that there was no evidence that they should be taken as one unified document. The language used in the arbitration agreement was very vague and never specifically referred to the nursing home care contract, nor did the nursing home care contract ever refer to the arbitration agreement. Specifically, the arbitration agreement stated, “Notwithstanding the parties intent to submit any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this agreement or any other document signed or initialed in connection with this agreement to arbitration.”
While the court noted that prior case law has supported the connection between two separate documents signed at the same time, the law requires that “an enforceable contract must be premised on language that is definite and certain as to all essential terms.” Academy Chicago Publishers v. Cheever, 144 Ill. 2d1224, 30 (1991). The court found that the language included in the arbitration agreement did not satisfy this requirement.

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Yesterday Chicago personal injury attorney Robert Kreisman attended a breakfast at Chicago’s Union League Club featuring Sergeant James “Eddie” Wright (USMC, Retired) as its speaker. The retired sergeant was wounded while serving on active duty in Iraq and has since become a spokesperson and fundraising advocate for Wounded Warriors, a program that assists wounded combat veterans as they adjust to civilian life.

Sergeant Wright comes from a military family and had dreamed of becoming a Marine ever since his childhood. He graduated from Boot Camp and Camp Pendleton’s School of Infantry (SOI) and was deployed to Iraq in February 2004 as part of the Operation Iraqi Freedom II campaign.

Within two months of his deployment Sergeant Wright’s company came under heavy fire, leaving Wright severely wounded. His bravery and composure on that day earned him the Bronze Star. Wright spent a year recovering and rehabbing at Walter Reed Army Medical Center before returning to complete two years of active duty. Wright instructed his fellow Marines in hand-to-hand combat as part of the Marine Corps Martial Arts Commitment of Excellence (MACE).

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A Cook County personal injury lawsuit involving an Illinois auto accident that left a 19 year-old girl a quadriplegic recently received a $6.05 million settlement. The bulk of the settlement in Perez v. Baeza, et al., No. 09 L 3958 came from Sparco, a distributor of race car seats that was involved in the case under product liability claims. Sparco contributed $6 million, which was the full extent of its insurance policy.

The events leading to the case began in 2005 when Perez’s boyfriend, Baeza, was driving them home from a quinceañera, i.e. a coming of age celebration for a 15 year-old girl. Baeza had been drinking and was speeding along when his car left the roadway and struck a tree. He was later charged with an aggravated DUI.

At the time of the Illinois car crash Perez was a passenger in the front seat. Baeza had modified the front seats of his car, replacing the factory-installed seats with race car seats distributed by the California-based Sparco Motor Sports, Inc. Perez was left a quadriplegic as a result of the auto accident.

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An Illinois lawsuit alleging fraud filed by three of a corporation’s directors and officers against its remaining directors and officers. Zahl v. Krupa, et al., No. 2-08-0844 (April 13, 2010), had previously been reviewed by the Illinois Appellate Court after plaintiffs’ three counts of fraud and breach-of-contract were dismissed, at which point it was reversed and remanded back to the lower court. The case came before the Appellate Court a second time, this time regarding the dismissal of all but one of the corporation’s directors and officers.

The majority of the corporation’s directors and officers alleged that they should be dismissed from the case because they had no knowledge of the fraud committed by Krupa, an officer of the corporation. The main issue in the plaintiffs’ complaint was that Krupa had conned plaintiffs into giving him their money for a special “investment fund” he alleged was limited to the corporation’s officers and directors. The issue before the Appellate Court was whether the remaining officers and directors are liable for Krupa’s actions.

The Appellate Court referred to Murphy v. Walters, 87 Ill.App.3d 415 (1980) when considering the remaining officers and directors’ liability.

As a general rule, a corporation’s officer or director is not liable for the fraud of other officers or agents merely because of its official character, but he is individually liable for fraudulent acts of his own or in which he participates. . . He is liable only if he with knowledge, or recklessly without it, participates or assists in the fraud.

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